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Abstract: Insurance contract can be considered from a view point of two person
game between two participants, i.e., the buyer and the seller. This report is the
republication of the results on optimal insurance contracts from the viewpoint of
each of the two participants, under some plausible conditions, presented by
Teraoka about forty years ago. These were the advancement of the ideas
suggested from Arrow and Miller.
1. Introduction
In this report, we republish to make instruction on the problem of choosing the
“optimal bounded insurance contracts” from the view point of each of the two
participants, i.e., the buyer and the seller, under some plausible conditions. Arrow
[1] and Miller [2] have already described case where the monetary refund does not
have an upper bound. In the real world, however, the insurance company does not
pay more than certain amount of money to the beneficiary, so we shall call such a
contract“bounded”. We gave four theorems which state that the“optimal bounded
contract” for the buyer is “bounded stop.loss” and one for the seller is “bounded
proportional”. These were evidently generalization of the results from Arrow and
Miller in [1] and [2]. Those were appeared by Teraoka[3], however, the journal
which printed it has ceased to published more than thirty years ago, consequently
it is very difficult to read the paper now.
We shall also instruct two optimal insurance contracts from the view point of
each of the two participants, under a kind of duality conditions for the above two
results. It was shown that the optimal insurance contracts are “minimum
truncated” for the seller and “bounden proportional” for the buyer, and the latter
contract is the common one for the two under disadvantage conditions for each
other. There were also given by Teraoka[4] 1977, however, the paper which
printed them contains the printer’s error in the main result. Thus we shall
instruct our results obtained about forty years ago in this report $\ldots$
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2. Assumptions
Suppose that buyer faces a positive.valued monetary risk with a cumulative
distribution $F(x)$ and has $utility\cdot of\cdot$money function $u(\cdot)$ . Thus his expected
utihty of facing the risk is $\zeta u(-x)dF(x)$ . We also assume that the seller of the
insurance sells a contract $T(\cdot)$ in such a way that if the loss $x$ is incurred by the
buyer, the seller will pay the buyer an amount $T(x)$ which satisfies
$0 \leq T(x)\leq\min(x,K)$ , where $K$ is a $pre\cdot$assigned positive constant. Let $\pi$ be the
premium which is usually equal to $\pi=\zeta\tau(x)dF(x)$ . We also assume that the
seller has $utility\cdot of$-money function $v(\cdot)$ , and that both of $u(\cdot)$ and $v(\cdot)$ are
twice differentiable and concave, that is, $u’(\cdot)\geq 0,$ $u”(\cdot)\leq 0,$ $v’(x)\geq 0$ , and
$v”(x)\leq 0$ for all $x$ . Then the expected utilities for each are
$fu[-\pi-x+T(x)]dF(x)$ and $\zeta v[\pi-T(x)]dF(x)$
by making the contract.
Let $S_{F}(z)=f(x-z)dF(x)$ $=t(1-F(x))dx$ where the expected value
$E(X)=\zeta xdF(x)$ is assumed to exist. For any cumulative distribution function $F$
with finite mean $E(X)S_{F}(z)$ is non-negative, convex, and strictly decreasing on
the set where it is positive. Furthermore, $S_{F}(z)\geq E(X)-z,$ $(0\leq z\leq\infty)$ , and
$S_{F}(0)=E(X), \lim_{zarrow\infty}S_{F}(z)=0$ . We denote the inverse function of $S_{F}(z)$ by $S_{F}^{-1}(c)$
for $0<c\leq E(X)..$
3. The Optimal Bounded Insurance Contracts
Result.1 presents an optimal bounded insurance contract from the viewpoint of
the buyer, and Result.2 offers it for the seller under some condition. We find that
the optimal contract for the buyer is “bounded stop loss “and one for the seller is
“bounded proportional”
Result.1. Let $\pi$ be a positive number, and let $\tau_{K}$ be the set ofall insurance
agreement of $T(\cdot)$ such that $\zeta\tau(x)dF(x)=\pi$ and $0 \leq T(x)\leq\min(x,K)$ , where
$K\geq S_{F}^{-1}(E(X)-\pi)$ .
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Then for any utility function $u(\cdot)$
(1) $\max_{T\epsilon r_{K}}\zeta u[-\pi-x+T(x)]dF(x)=\zeta u[-\pi-x+T_{K}(x)]dF(x)$ ,
where
(2) $T_{K}^{\cdot}(x)=\{\begin{array}{ll}0, 0\leq x<a_{K}\min(x-a_{K},K) , x\geq a_{K}\end{array}$
and $a_{K}$ is the unique root ofequation
(3) $S_{F}(a_{K})-S(a_{K}+K)=\pi$
and satisfies
(4) $0\leq a_{K}\leq S_{F}^{-1}(\pi)$ .
Proof. Since $u^{\mathfrak{l}}(x)\leq 0$ , we have
(5) $u[-\pi-x+T(x)]-u[-\pi-x+T_{K}^{\cdot}(x)]\leq\{T(x)-T_{K}^{\cdot}(x)\}u’(-\pi-x+T_{K}^{\cdot}(x))$ .
We find that
(6) $u’(-\pi-x+T_{K}^{\cdot}(x))=\{\begin{array}{l}u(-\pi-x)\leq u.(-\pi-a_{K})\prime, 0\leq x\leq a_{K}u’(-\pi-a_{K}) , a_{K}<x\leq a_{K}+K.u’(-\pi-x+K)\geq u’(-\pi-a_{K}), x\geq a_{K}+K\end{array}$
The definition of $T_{K}(x)$ gives
(7) $T(x)-T_{K}^{\cdot}(x)=\{\begin{array}{ll}T(x)\geq 0, 0\leq x\leq a_{K}T(x)-K\leq 0, x\geq a_{K}\end{array}$






Since $S_{F}(x)-S_{F}(x+K)$ , for $x\geq 0$, is decreasing from $E(X)-S_{F}(K)$ to zero,
the condition $E(X)-S_{F}(K)\geq\pi$ i.e., $K\geq S_{F}^{-1}(E(X)-\pi)$ assures the unique
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existence of $a_{K}$ satisfying Equation (3) and Inequality (4). This completes the
proof of Result 1.
Result 2. Let $\pi$ be a positive number and let $\tau_{K}^{0}$ be the set ofall insurance
agreement of $T(\cdot)$ such that $\zeta\tau(x)dF(x)=\pi$ and $0 \leq T(x)\leq\min(x,K)$ , where
$K\geq S_{F}^{-1}(E(X)-\pi)$ , and $T(x)/x$ is a $non\cdot$decreasing function of $x$ if $T(x)<K,$
Then for any utility function $v(\cdot)$
(8) $\max_{T\in\tau_{\kappa^{0}}}\zeta u[\pi-T(x)]dF(x)=\zeta u[\pi-T_{K}^{0}(x)]dF(x)$ ,
where
(9) TK $0_{(x)=}\{\begin{array}{ll}q_{K}x, 0\leq x<K/q_{K}K, x\geq K/q_{K}\end{array}$




Proof. First we shall prove Equation (11). Putting $t=K/q$ , Equation (10) is
rewritten by
(12) $S_{F}(t)=E(X)-(\pi/K)t.$
From the assumption of $K$ , we obtain
$S_{F}(K)\leq E(X)-\pi$ and $0<\pi<K.$
Hence the root $t^{0}$ of (12) exists uniquely and
$\max(E(X),K)\leq t^{0}(=K/q^{0},say)\leq(K/\pi)E(X)$
giving
$\pi/E(X)\leq q^{0}\leq\min(K/E(X), 1)$ .
Next we shall prove that $T_{K}^{0}(x)$ is an optimal contract for the seller. We
clearly have
(13) $v[\pi-T(x)]-v[\pi-T_{K}^{0}(x)]\leq\{T_{K}^{0}(x)-T(x)\}n^{!}[\pi-T_{K}^{0}(x)].$
From the definition of TK $0_{(x)}$ and $0<q<1$ , we obtain
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(14) TK $0_{(x)-T(x)=}\{\begin{array}{l}x[q-\{T(x)/x\}1K-T(x) ,\end{array}$




(8) is derived from (13). Therefore, we shall prove the case where $F(K/q)$
$=Pr\{X\leq K/q\}>0$ . Suppose that $T(K/q)<K$ , then
(15) $T_{K}^{0}(x)-T(x)=x[q-\{T(x)/x\}1$ for $0<x<K/q,$
since $T(x)/x$ is a $non\cdot$decreasing function so far as $T(x)<K$ . Therefore we
obtain from (14) and (15)
$\zeta k_{K}^{0}(x)-T(x)\}iF(x)>0,$
contradicting to $T(x)\in\tau_{K}^{0}$ Hence we find that for any $T(x)\in\tau_{K}^{0}$




From the above results, if $F(K/q)>0$ then there exists a $\gamma\in(0,K/q]$ such that
(17) $T_{K}^{0}(x)=qx\{\begin{array}{l}><\end{array}\}T(x)$ if $\{\begin{array}{ll}0< x<\gamma\gamma<x<K/q \end{array}\}.$
Since we obtain
$v^{!}[\pi-T_{K}^{0}(x)]=v^{!}(\pi-qx)\{\begin{array}{l}\leq\geq\end{array}\}v^{!}(\pi-q\gamma)$ , if $\{\begin{array}{ll}0< x\leq\gamma\gamma\leq x\leq K/q \end{array}\},$
(13), (16) and (17) give




This complete the proof.
55
If $F(x)>0$ for any finite $x\geq 0$ , then letting $Karrow\infty$ , we have the
unbounded cases (Arrow[l] and Miller[2]), in which the optimal contract for the
buyer is (from Result 1) of stop-loss type with stop-loss point $a_{\infty}=S_{F}^{-1}(\pi)$ , and
the optimal contract for the seller is (from Result 2) of proportional type with the
rate $q_{\infty}=\pi/E(X)$ .
Here we consider the optimal insurance contracts under a kind of duality
conditions for the above two resuts. Result 3 shows an optimal bounded
insurance contract from the view point of the seller under generous conditions,
and Result 4 suggests it for the buyer under disadvantage conditions. It is found
that the optimal contract for the seller is “minimum truncated” and one for trhe
buyer is “bounded proportional” it is the very same contract as one for the seller
under disadvantage conditions given by Result 2.
Result 3. Let $\pi$ be a positive number and let $\tau_{K}$ be the set ofall insurance
agreement of $T(\cdot)$ such that $\zeta\tau(x)dF(x)=\pi$ and $0 \leq T(x)\leq\min(x,K)$ , where
$K\geq S_{F}^{-1}(E(X)-\pi)$ .
Then for any utility function $v(\cdot)$
$\max_{T\in\tau_{K}}\zeta v[\pi-T(x)]dF(x)=\rfloor^{\infty}v[\pi-T.(x)]dF(x)$ ,
where
$T,(x)=\{\begin{array}{ll}x, 0\leq x<a_{K}b, x\geq a_{K}\end{array}$
and $b$ is the unique root ofequation $S_{F}(b)=E(X)-\pi$ , that is
$b=S_{F}^{-1}(E(X)-\pi)..$
(We omit the proof since it can be found in Teaoka[4]).
Result 4. Let $\pi$ be a positive number, and let $\tau_{K}$
’
be the set ofall insurance
agreement of $T(\cdot)$ such that $\zeta\tau(x)dF(x)=\pi$ and $0 \leq T(x)\leq\min(x,K)$ , where
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$K\geq S_{F}^{-1}(E(X)-\pi)$ , and $T(x)/x$ is a no$n^{}$ increasing $fu$ ction of $x$ if $T(x)<K.$
Then for any utility function $u(\cdot)$
$\max_{T\in\tau_{K}}, \zeta u[-\pi-x+T(x)]dF(x)=\zeta u[-\pi-x+T_{K}^{0}(x)]dF(x)$ ,
where
TK $0_{(x)=}\{\begin{array}{ll}q_{K}x, 0\leq x<K/q_{K}K, x\geq K/q_{K}\end{array}$




(We also omit the proof since we can refer to Teraoka[4].)
Note that TK $0_{(x)}$ is a common contract under disadvantage conditions for the
two participants, the buyer and the seller of the insurance. Furthermore, $T_{*}(x)$ is
in contrast with $T_{K^{+}}(x)$ and $T\kappa^{0}(x)$ takes a compromised position between
$T_{K^{+}}(x)$ and $T.(x)$ .
As a simple example of our results we examined the case of automobile
physical damage insurance for private passenger automobile $(small\cdot size)$ in [4].
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